The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Congress is Preparing to Restore Quotas in College Admissions

And everywhere else -- as a very quiet part of the bipartisan "privacy" bill

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More than two-thirds of Americans think the Supreme Court was right to hold Harvard's race-based admissions policy unlawful. But the minority who disagree have no doubt about their own moral authority, and there's every reason to believe that they intend to undo the Court's decision at the earliest opportunity.

Which could be as soon as this year. In fact, undoing the Harvard admissions decision is the least of it. Republicans and Democrats in Congress have embraced a precooked "privacy" bill that will impose race and gender quotas not just on academic admissions but on practically every private and public decision that matters to ordinary Americans. The provision could be adopted without scrutiny in a matter of weeks; that's because it is packaged as part of a bipartisan bill setting federal privacy standards—something that has been out of reach in Washington for decades. And it looks as though the bill breaks the deadlock by giving Republicans some of the federal preemption their business allies want while it gives Democrats and left-wing advocacy groups a provision that will quietly overrule the Supreme Court's Harvard decision and impose identity-based quotas on a wide swath of American life.

This tradeoff first showed up in a 2023 bill that Democratic and Republican members of the House commerce committee approved by an overwhelming 53-2 vote. That bill, however, never won the support of Sen. Cantwell (D-WA), who chairs the Senate commerce committee. This time around, a lightly revised version of the bill has been endorsed by both Sen. Cantwell and her House counterpart, Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA). The bill has a new name, the American Privacy Rights Act of 2024 (APRA), but it retains the earlier bill's core provision, which uses a "disparate impact" test to impose race, gender, and other quotas on practically every institutional decision of importance to Americans.

"Disparate impact" has a long and controversial history in employment law; it's controversial because it condemns as discriminatory practices that disproportionately affect racial, ethnic, gender, and other protected groups. Savvy employers soon learn that the easiest way to avoid disparate impact liability is to eliminate the disparity – that is, to hire a work force that is balanced by race and ethnicity. As the Supreme Court pointed out long ago, this is a recipe for discrimination; disparate impact liability can "leave the employer little choice . . . but to engage in a subjective quota system of employment selection."  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1989), quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 448 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

In the context of hiring and promotion, the easy slide from disparate impact to quotas has proven controversial. The Supreme Court decision that adopted disparate impact as a legal doctrine, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 432 (1971), has been persuasively criticized for ignoring Congressional intent. G. Heriot, Title VII Disparate Impact Liability Makes Almost Everything Presumptively Illegal, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 1 (2020). In theory, Griggs allowed employers to justify a hiring rule with a disparate impact if they could show that the rule was motivated not by animus but by business necessity. A few rules have been saved by business necessity; lifeguards have to be able to swim. But in the years since Griggs, the Supreme Court and Congress have struggled to define the business necessity defense; in practice there are few if any hiring qualifications that clearly pass muster if they have a disparate impact.

And there are few if any employment qualifications that don't have some disparate impact. As Prof. Heriot has pointed out, "everything has a disparate impact on some group:"

On average, men are stronger than women, while women are generally more capable of fine handiwork. Chinese Americans and Korean Americans score higher on standardized math tests and other measures of mathematical ability than most other national origin groups….

African American college students earn a disproportionate share of college degrees in public administration and social services. Asian Americans are less likely to have majored in Psychology. Unitarians are more likely to have college degrees than Baptists.…

I have in the past promised to pay $10,000 to the favorite charity of anyone who can bring to my attention a job qualification that has made a difference in a real case and has no disparate impact on any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin group. So far I have not had to pay.

Id. at 35-37. In short, disparate impacts are everywhere in the real world, and so is the temptation to solve the problem with quotas. The difficulty is that, as the polls about the Harvard decision reveal, most Americans don't like the solution. They think it's unfair. As Justice Scalia noted in 2009, the incentives for racial quotas set the stage for a "war between disparate impact and equal protection." Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009).

Not surprisingly, quota advocates don't want to fight such a war in the light of day. That's presumably why APRA obscures the mechanism by which it imposes quotas.

Here's how it works. APRA's quota provision, section 13 of APRA, says that any entity that "knowingly develops" an algorithm for its business must evaluate that algorithm "to reduce the risk of" harm. And it defines algorithmic "harm" to include causing a "disparate impact" on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or disability" (plus, weirdly, "political party registration status"). APRA Sec. 13(c)(1)(B)(vi)(IV)&(V).

At bottom, it's as simple as that. If you use an algorithm for any important decision about people—to hire, promote, advertise, or otherwise allocate goods and services—you must ensure that you've reduced the risk of disparate impact.

The closer one looks, however, the worse it gets. At every turn, APRA expands the sweep of quotas. For example, APRA does not confine itself to hiring and promotion. It provides that, within two years of the bill's enactment, institutions must reduce any disparate impact the algorithm causes in access to housing, education, employment, healthcare, insurance, or credit.

No one escapes. The quota mandate covers practically every business and nonprofit in the country, other than financial institutions. APRA sec. 2(10). And its regulatory sweep is not limited, as you might think, to sophisticated and mysterious artificial intelligence algorithms. A "covered algorithm" is broadly defined as any computational process that helps humans make a decision about providing goods or services or information. APRA, Section 2 (8).  It covers everything from a ground-breaking AI model to an aging Chromebook running a spreadsheet. In order to call this a privacy provision, APRA says that a covered algorithm must process personal data, but that means pretty much every form of personal data that isn't deidentified, with the exception of employee data. APRA, Section 2 (9).

Actually, it gets worse. Remember that some disparate impacts in the employment context can be justified by business necessity. Not under APRA, which doesn't recognize any such defense. So if you use a spreadsheet to rank lifeguard applicants based on their swim test, and minorities do poorly on the test, your spreadsheet must be adjusted until the scores for minorities are the same as everyone else's.

To see how APRA would work, let's try it on Harvard. Is the university a covered entity? Sure, it's a nonprofit. Do its decisions affect access to an important opportunity? Yes, education.  Is it handling nonpublic personal data about applicants? For sure. Is it using a covered algorithm?  Almost certainly, even if all it does is enter all the applicants' data in a computer to make it easier to access and evaluate. Does the algorithm cause harm in the shape of disparate impact? Again, objective criteria will almost certainly result in underrepresentation of various racial, religious, gender, or disabled identity groups. To reduce the harm, Harvard will be forced to adopt admissions standards that boost black and Hispanic applicants past Asian and white students with comparable records. The sound of champagne corks popping in Cambridge will reach all the way to Capitol Hill.

Of course, Asian students could still take Harvard to court. There is a section of APRA that seems to make it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race and ethnicity. APRA Sec. 13(a)(1). But in fact APRA offers the nondiscrimination mandate only to take it away. It carves out an explicit exception for any covered entity that engages in self-testing "to prevent or mitigate unlawful discrimination" or to" diversify an applicant, participant, or customer pool." Harvard will no doubt say that it adopted its quotas after its "self-testing" revealed a failure to achieve diversity in its "participant pool," otherwise known as its freshman class.

Even if the courts don't agree, the Federal Trade Commission can ride to the rescue. APRA gives the Commission authority to issue guidance or regulations interpreting APRA – including issuing a report on best practices for reducing the harm of disparate impact. APRA Sec. 13(c)(5)&(6). What are the odds that a Washington bureaucracy won't endorse race-based decisions as a "best practice"?

It's worth noting that, while I've been dunking on Harvard, I could have said the same about AT&T or General Electric or Amazon. In fact, big companies with lots of personal data face added scrutiny under APRA; they must do a quasipublic "impact assessment" explaining how they are mitigating any disparate impact caused by their algorithms. That creates heavy pressure to announce publicly that they've eliminated all algorithmic harm. That will be an added incentive to implement quotas, but as with Harvard, many big companies don't really need an added incentive. They all have active internal DEI bureaucracies that will be happy to inject even more race and gender consciousness into corporate life, as long the injection is immune from legal challenge.

And immune it will be.  As we've seen, APRA provides strong legal cover for institutions that adopt quota systems. And I predict that, for those actually using artificial intelligence, there will be an added layer of obfuscation that will stop legal challenges before they get started. It seems likely that the burden of mitigating algorithmic harm will quickly be transferred from the companies buying and using algorithms to the companies that build and sell them. Algorithm vendors are already required by many buyers to certify that their products are bias-free. That will soon become standard practice. With APRA on the books, there won't be any doubt that the easiest and safest way to "eliminate bias" will be to build quotas in.

That won't be hard to do. Artificial intelligence and machine learning vendors can use their training and feedback protocols to achieve proportional representation of minorities, women, and the disabled.

During training, AI models are evaluated based on how often they serve up the "right" answers. Thus, a model designed to help promote engineers may be asked to evaluate the resumes of actual engineers who've gone through the corporate promotion process. Its initial guesses about which engineers should be promoted will be compared to actual corporate experience.  If the machine picks candidates who performed badly, its recommendation will be marked wrong and it will have to try again. Eventually the machine will recognize the pattern of characteristics, some not at all obvious, that make for a promotable engineer.

But everything depends on the training, which can be constrained by arbitrary factors. A company that wanted to maximize two things—the skill of its senior engineers and their intramural softball prowess—could easily train its algorithm to downgrade engineers who can't throw or hit. The algorithm would eventually produce the best set of senior managers consistent with winning the intramural softball tournament every year. Of course, the model could just as easily be trained to produce the best set of senior engineers consistent with meeting the company's demographic quotas. And the beauty from the company's point of view is that the demographic goals never need to be acknowledged once the training has been completed – probably in some remote facility owned by its vendor. That uncomfortable topic can be passed over in silence. Indeed, it may even be hidden from the company that purchases the product, and it will certainly be hidden from anyone the algorithm disadvantages.

To be fair, unlike its 2023 predecessor, APRA at least nods in the direction of helping the algorithm's victims.  A new Section 14 requires that institutions tell people if they are going to be judged by an algorithm, provide them with "meaningful information" about how the algorithm makes decisions, and give them an opportunity to opt out.

This is better than nothing, for sure. But not by much.  Companies won't have much difficulty providing a lot of information about how its algorithms work without ever quite explaining who gets the short end of the disparate-impact stick. Indeed, as we've seen, the company that's supposed to provide the information may not even know how much race or gender preference has been built into its outcomes. More likely it will be told by its vendor, and will repeat, that the algorithm has been trained and certified to be bias-free.

What if a candidate suspects the algorithm is stacked against him? How does section 14's assurance that he can opt out help? Going back to our Harvard example, suppose that an Asian student figures out that the algorithm is radically discounting his achievements because of his race. If he opts out, what will happen?  He won't be subjected to the algorithm. Instead, presumably, he'll be put in a pool with other dissidents and evaluated by humans—who will almost certainly wonder about his choice and may well presume that he's a racist. Certainly, opting out provides the applicant no protection, given the power and information imbalance between him and Harvard.  Yet that is all that APRA offers.

Let's be blunt; this is nuts. Overturning the Supreme Court's Harvard admissions decision in such a sneaky way is bad enough, but imposing Harvard's identity politics on practically every part of American life—housing, education, employment, healthcare, insurance, and credit for starters – is worse. APRA's effort to legalize, if not mandate, quotas in all these fields has nothing to do with privacy. The bill deserves to be defeated or at least shorn of sections 13 and 14.

These are the provisions that I've summarized here, and they can be excised without affecting the rest of the bill. That is the first order of business. But efforts to force quotas into new fields by claiming they're needed to remedy algorithmic bias will continue, and they deserve a solution bigger than defeating a single bill. I've got some thoughts about ways to legislate protection against those efforts that I'll save for a later date. For now, though, passage of APRA is an imminent threat, particularly in light of the complete lack of concern expressed so far by any member of Congress, Republican or Democrat.

Supreme Court

Dobbs and the Originalists

Why originalist criticisms of Dobbs often misfire, and why criticisms *of* Dobbs's originalism often misfire too.

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Was Dobbs an originalist opinion? Did it abandon originalism for "history and tradition"? Or did the Court's history show originalism itself to be fatally flawed?

I'd say "yes," "no," and "of course not." To that end, I've got a new paper, forthcoming in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, defending Dobbs on originalist grounds. It's short—18 pages!—and tries to get the point across quickly. From the abstract:

Though often hailed as an originalist triumph, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization has also been condemned as an originalist betrayal. To some, it abandoned originalism's principles in favor of a Glucksbergesque history-and-tradition test, or even a "living traditionalism"; to others, its use of originalism was itself the betrayal, yoking modern law to an oppressive past.

This essay argues that Dobbs is indeed an originalist opinion: if not distinctively originalist, then originalism-compliant, the sort of opinion an originalist judge could and should have written. Dobbs shows the importance of looking to our original law—to all of it, including lawful doctrines of procedure and practice, and not just to wooden caricatures of original public meaning. As the case was framed, the Court's focus on history and tradition was the correct approach; on the evidence presented, it reached the correct originalist result. Understanding the Fourteenth Amendment as securing old rights, rather than as letting judges craft new ones, leaves more rather than fewer choices for today's voters. In any case, it may be the law we've made, both in the 1860s and today.

And from the intro:

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization is widely regarded as a "triumph for originalism." For years, many people had assumed that opposing the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey was what it meant to be an originalist; to see Roe and Casey overturned would naturally be an originalist victory.

But almost as soon as Dobbs was handed down, critics began to describe it as an originalist betrayal. Some saw it as a betrayal of originalism, arguing that the Court hadn't been originalist enough. What was it doing, citing substantive due process cases like Washington v. Glucksberg? Why wasn't it throwing Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Lawrence v. Texas, or Obergefell v. Hodges under the bus? Was this "a form of living constitutionalism," or a "living traditionalism," or something more exotic still? Others, meanwhile, portrayed Dobbs's originalism itself as the betrayal—decrying the decision as a flawed effort both in process and in substance, one that engaged in bad history to reach bad results.

Both criticisms go awry. Dobbs was indeed an originalist opinion as a matter of form; on the arguments presented, it was also correct as a matter of originalist substance. True, the Dobbs Court cited and applied its modern precedents on substantive due process, and it didn't cite Madison or John Bingham every other page. In that sense it wasn't a distinctively originalist opinion, the kind that only a faithful originalist could write. But it was an originalism-compatible opinion, the kind a faithful originalist could write. Indeed, it appears to have been an originalism-compliant opinion, the kind a faithful originalist should write, reaching the right originalist result for what were essentially the right originalist reasons.

To understand why, though, we have to pay attention to some recent developments in originalist theory. In particular, we have to distinguish specific questions of original meaning from more general—and, here, more relevant—questions of original law: that is, the law of the United States as it stood at the Founding, and as it's been lawfully changed to the present day. That law includes enacted law, such as the Constitution, statutes, and treaties, but it also includes unwritten law, such as unabrogated rules of the common law, equity, or admiralty. In particular, it includes common-law doctrines of party presentation and of stare decisis, which might have obliged an originalist Court to rule just as it did. If both parties in Dobbs accepted the authority of Washington v. Glucksberg, it can't be too surprising that the Court might have gone ahead and Glucksberged.

Once we understand the role of unwritten law, we can also see that something not too far from Dobbs's history-and-tradition test may in fact be what the Constitution commands. Many originalists reject doctrines of substantive due process but understand the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive rights guarantees to relate to the Privileges or Immunities Clause instead. This Clause likely protects a variety of preexisting rights defined by general law—rights that we today might call common-law rights, but not in the sense of being up to state or federal judges to invent. The Clause obliges us to look to history for these rights, not because the past must always be preserved inviolate, but because certain past practices are evidence of past legal rules, and those rules are all the Amendment foists on us today. If the resulting doctrine is narrower than some might like, this just means the Amendment's yoke is easy and its burden light; the remaining decisions are up to us, and to our "elected representatives."

As they say, read the whole thing!

Free Speech

Court Declines to Dismiss Libel Suit by Anthropologist Accused of Mishandling Human Remains from Project MOVE Bombing

The case was brought by Dr. Janet Monge against the University of Pennsylvania.

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From yesterday's opinion by Judge Gene Pratter (E.D. Pa.) in Monge v. Univ. of Penn.:

In The Canceling of the American Mind, Greg Lukianoff and Rikki Schlott argue that the "modern era of Cancel Culture" began in 2014 and continues to the present. From 2014 to mid-2023, the authors argue that there were "more than 1,000 attempts to get professors fired, punished, or otherwise silenced."  Of those, two-thirds of cases were successful in that they led to "consequences from investigation to termination."  The authors argue that the sheer number of professors being fired is "truly unprecedented" and has not "been seen since the Supreme Court first established First Amendment protections of academic freedom and campus speech."  According to the authors, "more professors have been terminated during the era of Cancel Culture than in the era of McCarthyism[.]"

Enter Dr. Janet Monge, who spent much of her academic career working for the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. Dr. Monge alleges that she is one of the numerous professors who has been a victim of the modern era of Cancel Culture. Dr. Monge brings defamation [claims, among others] against, among others, the University of Pennsylvania, former Penn President Dr. Amy Gutmann, and former Penn Provost Dr. Wendell Pritchett ("Penn Defendants") for statements that they made regarding Dr. Monge's role as an anthropology professor when she used bone fragments and unidentified remains of victims of the 1985 MOVE bombing in an online anthropology course….

To vastly oversimplify the factual backstory, in 1985 the Philadelphia police bombed a building inhabited by "the MOVE family," also known as the Africa family, a commune of self-described revolutionaries, killing "Eleven MOVE members …, presumably six adults and five children." There was some uncertainty about the identity of some of the remains, and Dr. Monge was one of the people who eventually investigated the matter, and was in charge of storing the bones. She also discussed and showed bone fragments in an online course, "Real Bones: Adventures in Forensic Anthropology":

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The Right Coast Blog Moves to a New Location

An interesting blog about politics, law, and culture

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Tom Smith, a law professor in San Diego (and my brother-in-law), has an interesting blog on politics, law, and culture—"The Right Coast." Because of some technical issues, he has had to move the blog to a new location, found here. Tom has asked me to pass along this note, which I am happy to do. It's a fun little blog that may be of interest.

Music

Rock and Roll!

Two wonderful and highly recommended treatments of the early history of rock-and-roll.

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I have recently come across two remarkable resources for any of you who are, like me, fascinated [perhaps to the point of obsession] by the early history of rock-and-roll.

The first is the podcast "A History of Rock Music in 500 Songs," [available at the usual spots, and here] produced by Andrew Hickey. It's just what it says it is, and it's pretty astonishing. Each episode tells the story of one song in amazing detail, with a focus on (a) the production: how the song was written, how/why/where it was recorded, who the backing musicians were and how they got there, how they decided to add horns or extra vocals or whatever, etc. etc.—and (b) the music business: who owned the publishing rights and how they got them, who owned the masters and what they did with them, who decided which tracks went on which albums or on 45s (remember 45s?), who got the songwriting credits and why …

The guy has done an unbelievable amount of research, and he tells a great story. I find it mesmerizing (though Hickey's narrating voice takes a little getting used to). It's definitely not for everyone; the episodes are pretty substantial in length (an hour or sometimes a bit more), and they contain more than most people probably want to know about, say, how George Martin ended up producing the Beatles because his boss wanted to punish him for being such a pain in the ass (and for having an affair with his secretary), or how Ike Everly, through his contacts at the barber shop that he owned and operated, helped his sons Phil and Don get their first recording contract, or why Dylan didn't use The Band to back him on Blonde on Blonde, or how Buddy Holly ended up on that airplane because his manager had stolen all of the money The Crickets had earned**, or how The Mob (not a band—the actual Mob) controlled huge swaths of the music business—the clubs, the music publishers and recording companies, the musicians' unions, etc.—in NYC in the '50s and '60s. Etc. etc.

**One of the many, many things about the music industry that I have learned from Hickey is that musicians didn't have to be black to get ripped off by the "suits," who were definitely equal-opportunity crooks and shysters.

But if you love this music and want to learn a shitload of stuff you never knew about how it came to be, I highly recommend it. If you want to give it a try, my advice is to pick a song you're particularly fond of—he's reached #174, moving chronologically from the beginnings in the late '30s through 1969 thus far.– and listen to what he has to say about it; that should give you a good sense of whether it's your kind of thing.

The second is something I picked up on Hickey's recommendation (in Episode 100 on "Love Me Do," the Beatles' first Parlophone single from 1962, which I particularly recommend):  Mark Lewisohn's magnificent and brilliant biography of the Beatles, "Tune In." This first (of a projected 3 volumes) covers, in 960+ pages (!), the years from their childhoods up to the end of 1962 and the imminent release of their second Parlophone single, "Please Please Me," which would become the first of 32 (!) Number 1 hits they released over the next 7 years.

I have long thought that no biography could possibly touch Robert Caro's magnificent multi-volume set on LBJ, but Lewisohn comes very close—an encyclopedic and incredibly engrossing social history of life in Liverpool (and the UK in general) in the immediate post-WWII years, with real insight into the peculiar combination of dumb luck, sheer brilliance, fearlessness, toughness, love, self-confidence, and single-mindedness of purpose, that enabled four teenage working-class school dropouts—from, of all places, Liverpool, a city in the throes of a terrible decline as a consequence of the twin shocks of Britain's de-industrialization and the ferocious pounding it took from the Germans—were able to transform the global entertainment industry and global culture.

In his Introduction, Lewisohn confronts the obvious question: do we really need 900+ pages and 400,000 words about the early years of what was, after all, just a rock-and-roll band, even one that was an especially terrific and influential one? Here's what he wrote; I think it's the best thing I've ever read about just how special the Beatles were:

"Every once in a while, life conjures up a genuine ultimate. It can be said without fear of hyperbole, this is what the Beatles were and are. And [sixty]-plus years after they leapt into view—[sixty!]—there's little hint it's going to change. So many would-be successors have come and gone, there's now an acceptance that no-one can be bigger or better. John Winston Lennon, James Paul McCartney, George Harrison, and Richard Starkey hold on strong, universally acknowledged as a cultural force, still somehow current and woven into the fabric of modern lives. John, Paul, George, and Ringo—the four Liverpool lads who pumped the heart of a decade that also won't shut up, the 1960s.

If it was necessary to "sell" the Beatles, you could point to many achievements, but their music underpins everything. One game-changing album after another, and one game-changing single after another, two hundred and fourteen tracks recorded in seven crowded years in a kaleidoscope of styles. This music is known, loved, respected, discussed, imitated, cherished, and studied. It continues to inspire new artists and be reshaped impressively in every genre. Its song titles and words are adapted for headlines in 21st century media, its quotes are enfolded in everyday vocabulary and chanted in football stadiums. Infused with the Beatles' energy and personalities, this music still lifts the spirit and is passed joyfully from generation to generation. Clearly, something special happened here—but what? How?

Consider too how the Beatles repeatedly married cutting-edge originality with immense mainstream popularity, when for almost anyone else these are mutually exclusive. And how and why they ditched their winning ideas every time the world raced to copy them. Consider how they did everything with down-to-earth humor, honesty, optimism, style, charisma, irreverence, intelligence, and a particularly spiky disdain for falseness. How they were articulate, bold, curious, direct, instinctive, challenging, blunt, sharp, polite, rude—prickers of pomposity, rule-breakers never cowed by convention. And consider how they created a profound and sustained connection to their public, and how they resisted branding, commercial sponsorship, and corporate affiliation and hype. The Beatles were free of artifice, and weren't the product of market research or focus groups or TV talent shows. They were original, and developed organically when everyone was looking the other way. . . .

I've been waiting for a book this sweeping story demands … one that explains how the society that shaped the Beatles first received them and then was shaped by them, how John, Paul, George, and Ringo dealt with each other as friends and bandmates, how they so deftly handled the media and such phenomenal celebrity, how they transformed the worldwide music industry and shook global youth culture awake, and how they induced a revolution in how people listen to and play music. The Beatles didn't invent the electric guitar, and weren't the first guitar group—but every rock band since 1963 is fulfilling their legacy …."

As with the Hickey podcast, it's not for everyone. But the Lewisohn book sweeps much more broadly Hickey's podcast, and I don't think you have to be quite the same kind of rock-and-roll obsessive to enjoy it and to learn an enormous amount about what the world was like in the middle of the last century.

Housing Policy

The YIMBY Napkin

Checking the credibility of Hsieh-Moretti the lazy way. Third in a series of guest-blogging posts.

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In 2019, Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti published "Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation" in the American Economic Journal. It's probably academia's most famous Yes In My Backyard (YIMBY) article. H-M imagined a scenario where New York City and the Bay Area never imposed draconian housing regulation. Then they estimated how much bigger the U.S. economy would have been in this alternate history. Their answer was shocking. Restraining local regulation in just two keys localities would have made total U.S. GDP 4-9% higher.

The key idea: New York City and the Bay Area are the country's most productive areas. Given the same inputs, they yield an exceptionally large quantity of output. In economic jargon, they have sky-high Total Factor Productivity. With much less housing regulation, housing prices in these TFP-rich areas would be much lower. Their populations would, in turn, be much higher. Production would naturally fall in low-TFP regions, but rise far more in high-TFP regions. As a result, the total output of the country would rise.

When writing Build, Baby, Build, I reviewed H-M closely. To my surprise, I discovered multiple arithmetic errors, which Hsieh and Moretti quickly acknowledged. Strangely, my corrections actually strengthened their results. Instead of implying that GDP would be 4-9% higher, their paper actually implies that GDP would be 14-36% higher. Super shocking!

Not long before my book went to print, however, economist Brian Greaney published a much more fundamental critique of H-M. This time, however, Hsieh and Moretti did not concede. Nor did Greaney. Given my time constraints, I decided to just insert a warning into the text and add a detailed endnote on the controversy. Like so:

Recently, however, I started wondering what a quick "back-of-the-envelope" or "napkin" calculation would reveal. When I teach the economic effects of immigration, for example, I normally start by multiplying rough estimates of (a) gains per immigrant by (b) total number of immigrants. In principle, one could do the same for domestic migration. Why not give it a try?

After looking for easily accessible data and weighing a few different approaches, I did the following.

  1. I found data on mean earnings by education by state (plus Washington, DC) in Table A6 of John Winters' "What You Make Depends on Where You Live: College Earnings Across State and Metropolitan Areas."
  2. To make life easier, I only did calculations for the "High School" and "Bachelor's Degree" calculations, and assumed that 2/3rds of workers were in the former category, and 1/3rd in the latter. Close enough.
  3. I coded the following as having "Bad Zoning": California, Connecticut, DC, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.
  4. I calculated population-weighted average mean earnings in Bad Zoning states, and assumed that post-deregulation migration into the Bad Zoning states would be proportional to their existing populations.
  5. I assumed that if Bad Zoning were ended, the fraction of workers who would move was directly proportion to the percentage wage gain for their educational category.
  6. I set an elasticity of .2, which implies that a 5% wage gain would induce 1% of workers to move.
  7. Snapping these pieces together, I calculated per-worker annual dollar gains for both educational categories for all states. If a mover gains $5000, but only 2% of workers would actually move, the per-worker gain is $100.
  8. I can use population weights to calculate per-worker gains for the whole country. If, for example, there were two states total, one with 1M people and the other with $99M, the per-worker gains for the country would be 1% times the gain in the first state plus 99% times the gain in the second state.
Invisible Hand

Since this was too much to actually write on a napkin, I set it all up as a simple Google Sheet, which you can view (and tinker with!) here. Obviously you can lodge dozens of complaints about what I did, but I'm just going for basic plausibility.

Here's what I found: Under my assumptions, GDP rises by $532 per worker, about +.8%. Much lower than H-M's original lower bound of +4%. A lot in absolute terms, but nothing transformative.

How sensitive are the results to the assumptions?

  1. The gains are directly proportional to the elasticity of .2 that I set in Assumption #6. If you think that a 1% wage gain will prompt 1% of workers to move, H-M's initial lower bound is correct. But that seems crazy high.
  2. I used state-level data because it was easier. But Table 11 in "What You Make Depends on Where You Live" has data on income by education for 104 metropolitan areas (MSAs). The poorest metropolitan areas are almost as poor as the poorest states, but the richest metropolitan areas are markedly richer than the richest states. The non-metropolitan areas would generally be poorer still.
  3. Upshot: A thought experiment where housing deregulation causes movement to the very richest metropolitan areas (rather than just the richest states) could plausibly yield gains twice as large as my initial estimates. If you want to do the actual work, I'll gladly run it as a guest post on my Substack.

Why are estimates of the domestic migration gains so much smaller than estimates of international migration gains?

First, because gains per capita are so much larger internationally. As Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (CMP) show, immigrants from the Third World to the U.S. routinely multiply their income by a factor of 5 or 10. In contrast, moving from the very poorest MSA (El Paso, Texas) to the very richest (Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, Connecticut) multiplies high school earnings by 1.6 and college earnings by 2.7. The biggest intra-national gains are about as big as the smallest international gains in CMP.

Second, because far more people want to migrate internationally. Massive gains motivate billions. Moderate gains motivate only millions, or perhaps tens of millions. Big times big is massive, but moderate times moderate remains moderate.

The lesson: Hsieh and Moretti's initial estimates were always implausibly large. When I corrected their math, yielding even bigger estimated effects, I should have taken out a napkin for a quick plausibility check.

Fortunately, I have another napkin. A better napkin. The cleanest, clearest case for YIMBY is simply that (a) housing deregulation would sharply reduce housing prices (by about 50%), and (b) housing is a large share of the household budget (about 20%). So deregulation would ultimately cut the cost of living by 10% — and raise living standards by 11%. (Read the book for details).

I'll never get in the American Economic Journal with this argument, but I say it's solid.

Chatting with Plato and Aristotle in Build, Baby Build

 

Free Speech

Excluding "FCANCER" Personalized License Plate Violates First Amendment

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So Judge Gregory Williams (D. Del.) held today, in Overington v. Fisher: Even if FCANCER is understood as meaning "Fuck Cancer" (rather than, say, "Fight Cancer"), the exclusion of "any plate considered offensive in nature" from the state's personalized plate program was unconstitutionally viewpoint-based and discretionary.

To reach this result, the judge had to decide whether the plates in the personalized plate program were private speech or government speech, and concluded that they were private speech. The court's analysis was close to the one I wrote about two years ago in this post about Ogilvie v. Gordon (N.D. Cal.).

Seems generally correct to me. Perhaps a narrow and specific prohibition on particular vulgarities might be viewpoint-neutral (even if content-based), and thus permissible in a "limited public forum" such as this one; but a ban on "any plate considered offensive in nature" doesn't qualify, see Iancu v. Brunetti (2019).

One error I noticed: The court cited Ogilvie for the proposition that "[O]bscenity, vulgarity, profanity, hate speech, and fighting words fall outside the scope of the First Amendment's protections"; but Ogilvie didn't hold that, and there are no First Amendment exceptions for vulgarity, profanity, or hate speech. Moreover, because "hate speech" is a viewpoint-based category (cf. Matal v. Tam (2017)), the government can't exclude "hate speech" even from limited public fora (or nonpublic fora), even if it could exclude "vulgarity" or "profanity."

Politics

Setting Issue Priorities

How to prioritize public policy issues - and why it matters.

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If you follow politics and public policy, you are likely to be bombarded with messages about a vast range of different issues. How do you prioritize among them?

Setting priorities is essential for a number of reasons.  Time, energy, and money devoted to Issue A are thereby denied to issues B, C, and D. Thus, we need to think about where these limited resources can do the most good. In deciding which candidate to vote for in an election, other things equal, a candidate who is good (or less bad) on high-priority issues is preferable to one who is bad on them—even if he or she is superior on less-important issues. Most electoral decisions involve choosing a lesser evil. Who that is depends in large part on the relative priority of issues.

It doesn't necessarily follow that we should always devote our time and effort exclusively to the most important issues. A large gain on a small issue might sometimes outweigh a small gain on a big one. And you can sometimes to do more good focusing on a small issue where you have real expertise than focusing on a big one about which you know very little. Nonetheless, the relative significance of issues should be a crucial factor in many decisions, even if it can't always be the only consideration. Thus, we need criteria for determining that.

Issue prioritization is partly a matter of values. For example, a utilitarian who cares only about consequences for human happiness and welfare is likely to have different priorities from a rights theorists who believes some rights should never be violated, regardless of consequences.

I won't try to resolve fundamental disagreements over values in this post. I will merely say that the values I consider most important are liberty (including property rights as well as bodily autonomy) and human happiness. I want people to be as free as possible, but also as happy as possible. These values are of obvious significance to libertarians (excluding, perhaps, some who completely reject consequentialism). But they are also important for most in the broader liberal tradition. Non-libertarian liberals still tend to value "negative" liberty, even if they don't give it as high a priority as libertarians do.

Given those values, how should we prioritize issues?

In a recent guest-blogging post, Bryan Caplan argues that housing deregulation should be a high-priority issue for libertarians, because of its enormous effects. Millions of people would enjoy lower housing prices and be free to "move to opportunity." Magnitude of effect is definitely an important criterion for prioritizing issues. An issue where there is a lot of freedom and happiness at stake is more important than one where the quantity is low.

The assessment of such impacts on liberty and happiness should focus on net effects: the overall impact of the policy. A policy that increases liberty or happiness in one way, but also results in a decrease of comparable magnitude by some other pathway, is less desirable than one that has a large positive impact on net. The same goes for issues where there are difficult trade-offs between liberty on one side and happiness/welfare on the other. Other things equal, they deserve a lower priority than ones where liberty and happiness are in alignment.

Caplan also argues that housing deregulation deserves high priority because there is a relatively simple fix available for the problem: to enable a massive increase in housing construction, government need only "get out of the way" by cutting back or eliminating exclusionary zoning and other regulations that current block it. That's relatively easy to do! By contrast, some policy issue might refer competence and "state capacity" well beyond anything that currently exists. Issues that require a major increase in competence or capacity deserve lower priority than ones where there is a simple fix that can be implemented quickly.

I would add that there is a related distinction between issues where there is room for incremental progress, and ones that are "all or nothing" propositions, where only a massive, radical change in policy can accomplish anything of value. Other things equal, the former deserve priority over the latter, except in rare "revolutionary" situations where radical change becomes more feasible than it usually is. For example, the conditions of the Civil War made immediate, nationwide abolition of slavery politically feasible, in a way that it clearly wasn't in earlier eras.

Thus, we have three criteria for prioritizing policy issues:

1. Magnitude of effects on human freedom and happiness. Big effects deserve priority over small ones.

2. Easy to implement solutions. Problems with simple, quick, fixes deserve priority over ones where the solution is difficult and/or requires a massive increase in competence and capacity.

3. The possibility of incremental progress. Issues where incremental progress is possible deserve priority over "all or nothing" issues, except in unusual revolutionary situations.

With these criteria in mind, here are three issues that I think deserve much higher priority than most people—including most of my fellow libertarians—give them: housing deregulation, easing immigration restrictions, and legalizing organ markets.

Bryan Caplan's post, linked above, is a good summary of the case for deregulating housing construction. It would make millions of people better off by reducing housing costs, and enabling more people to "move to opportunity" and "vote with their feet." In addition, this is a huge issue for people who care about liberty and property rights. Exclusionary zoning restricts property rights more than any other type of government regulation. It prevents hundreds of thousands of property owners from using their own property as they see fit. If you believe that property rights are a crucial component of liberty more generally, than zoning and other similar regulations are a massive affront to your values.

And, as Bryan also points out, there is an easy fix: simply repeal the regulations that stand in the way. Doing that does not require any great technocratic competence on the part of government.

Finally, there is tremendous room for incremental progress. Abolishing some exclusionary zoning rules but not others can still enable a lot more new housing to be built, and still strengthen protection for property rights. Ditto for deregulation that applies in some states or localities, but not others.

Regular readers won't be surprised that reducing immigration restrictions ranks high on my list of priority issues. Immigration restrictions literally consign millions of people to lives of poverty and oppression. Dropping them would massively increase freedom of virtually every kind: economic, personal, religious, and more. Think of people fleeing oppressive dictatorships like those escaping Cuba and Venezuela, people fleeing war (such as Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine), political and religious dissidents fleeing persecution, and so on.

Ending all or most immigration restrictions would also greatly increase liberty for native-born citizens of receiving countries, as well as the migrants themselves. I go into the reasons why here and here.

The positive impact on human happiness is also enormous. Economists estimate that free migration throughout the world would roughly double world GDP, by enabling millions of people to move to places where they can be more productive. In addition, immigrants disproportionately contribute to economic, scientific, and medical innovation, thereby further increasing the gains migration—including for natives, who also stand to benefit from all that progress. As an extra bonus, increasing opportunities for legal migration is also the best way to reduce chaos and disorder at borders, like the US border with Mexico.

Negative side effects of migration are nowhere near large enough to offset these enormous gains, and those side effects can be further reduced by "keyhole" solutions. I discuss how and why in more detail in Chapter 6 of my book Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom.

The policy fix here is simple: mainly, governments just need to cut back on laws and regulations that exclude migrants. Some keyhole solutions are more complicated. But they are nonetheless well within the competence of most existing First World governments. Examples include such things as restricting immigrants' eligibility for welfare benefits (which we already do under the 1996 welfare reform bill).

As with housing, there is plenty of room for incremental progress. Increasing the annual number of immigrants admitted to the United States by 10% would still enable about 100,000 more migrants to attain vast increases in freedom and happiness each year, as well as facilitate substantial gains for natives. The list of ways in which immigration restrictions can be incrementally liberalized is almost limitless.

My third under-rated issue is legalizing organ markets. Repealing the law banning the sale of kidneys would save some 40,000 lives every year, in the US alone, and also spare many thousands more people the pain of spending years on kidney dialysis.

Legalizing organ sales is also an important liberty issue. Exercising control over your own body is a fundamental element of liberty. If you believe in "my body, my choice," legalizing organ markets is a logical implication of your position.

Objections to organ markets are generally weak, and certainly nowhere near strong enough to justify the enormous death and suffering restrictions cause. In previous writings, I have critiqued standard arguments, such as concerns that it would be too dangerous for organ donorsclaims that it amounts to to immoral "commodification" of the body, and fears that it would lead to exploitation of the poor (see also here).

The fix for this problem is an easy one: simply repeal current laws banning organ sales! Implementing rules against coercion and fraud in organ markets is a bit more complex. But we already have such rules in other markets. There is no need for any major new type of state capacity that doesn't currently exist.

Incremental progress here is somewhat more difficult than with housing and immigration. It may seem as if legalizing organ markets is an all-or-nothing proposition. But that is far from entirely true. There are various ways in which we can legalize some types of payments for organs, while continuing to ban or restrict others. The recently proposed End Kidney Deaths Act is one example of such a proposal. We can also imagine legalization limited to some sellers, but not others (e.g.—if you are worried about "exploitation" of the poor, you can advocate legalizing sales only by the non-poor). In addition, survey data suggests the public is more open to broader legalization than usually thought.

This list is far from an exhaustive one. I chose these issues because they are particularly stark examples, and because I have relevant expertise about them.

There is, of course, the danger that these issues just seem important to me because I spend a lot of time on them. I can't definitively disprove that conjecture. But I will note that all three are issues to which I have gradually devoted more of my time and attention, as I came to realize how important they are. For example, my early work on property rights focused more on eminent domain. But I have written more about exclusionary zoning in recent years, because I have come to recognize its greater importance. There is a similar story in my work on "voting with your feet," which started with a focus on  domestic migration, but gradually shifted more to the international kind, because the gains from the latter are larger.

I won't try to do it here. But, applying the same criteria, we can easily come up with a list of issues that get too much attention, rather than too little.

There is, obviously, plenty of room for disagreement with both my criteria for prioritizing issues, and the application of those criteria to particular cases. But, at the very least, we should recognize that issue prioritization matters, and we need rigorous criteria for deciding which issues matter more than others.

Free Speech

Can Nonprofits That Help Organize Protests Lose Their Tax Exemptions?

Not because of the viewpoints they express—but yes if they engage in systematic illegal conduct.

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Senate Republicans have called on the IRS to investigate various nonprofits that have helped organize university protests, and see if they should be stripped of their tax exemptions. Would that be permissible?

[1.] The government can't strip groups of nonprofit status based on their ideological viewpoints. This was first made clear in Justice Brennan's opinion in Speiser v. Randall (1958), which struck down a denial of a property tax exemption to people and organizations that "advocate[] the overthrow of the Government of the United States … by … violence … or who advocate[] the support of a foreign government against the United States in the event of hostilities":

[A] discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. It is settled that speech can be effectively limited by the exercise of the taxing power. To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech…. [T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. The denial is "frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."

The Supreme Court reaffirmed this in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash. (1983) and Rosenberger v. Rector (1995): Though "the Government is not required to subsidize" speakers, once it chooses to provide such a subsidy—including through "tax deductions for contributions"—it must abide by "the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government's provision of financial benefits."

And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has specifically applied this (in Z Street v. Koskinen (D.C. Cir. 2015)) to denials of a 501(c)(3) tax exemption, holding that "in administering the tax code, the IRS may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint"—there, as it happens, against pro-Israel speech that departed from the Administration's foreign policy. There have been some viewpoint-based denials in the past (see Dale Carpenter's post for some examples), but these precedents pretty categorically forbid such denials.

[2.] But nonprofits' right to express viewpoints doesn't extend to a right to violate valid laws (such as content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions). IRS Revenue Ruling 75-384 deals specifically with that:

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Housing Policy

*Build, Baby, Build*: My Most Inexcusable Omission

Privatization of federal and state land is a massive missed opportunity. Second in a series of guest-blogging posts.

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Every author has to make choices. What's worth including? What isn't? When I finally read the published version of my new Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation, I was proud of my choices. False modesty aside, the book — a non-fiction graphic novel — looks great, and manages to cover almost every important angle.

With one inexcusable omission: I forgot to call for the privatization of government-owned land.

What makes this omission so inexcusable? Because I've known for many years that the share of land owned by U.S. federal and state governments is shockingly high. I just forgot about the issue until it was too late to alter the book.

To see the magnitude of government land ownership, check out these three fine maps.

First, here's federal land as a percentage of total state land area:

Second, here's state land as a percentage of total land area:

How much land does the government own in each US state? - SAS Learning Post

Finally, here's combined government ownership:

Here is what I wish I said about this topic:

  1. Government ownership of land is a massive missed opportunity for humanity. If the government auctioned off this vast expanse to the highest bidders, land prices would dramatically fall, and business could finally start unearthing and developing its untold riches for human betterment.
  2. Yes, most government intervention in the housing market is state and local. But if you count government ownership of land as "intervention" — as you should — the federal government's role suddenly looks a lot bigger. Which in turn means that the feds could move housing policy in a sharply more free-market direction without involving any other level of government.
  3. Privatization would also let the federal government drastically slash its staggering debt — which now stands at 120% of U.S. GDP! State government debt loads and land ownership are both far lower. But mass privatization of state land would plausibly allow New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and perhaps a few other states to to pay off everything they owe, then fund permanent, sustainable tax cuts with the revenue raised.
  4. The obvious objection to privatization is that government owns the land that nobody else wants. While auctioneers could make a lot of money selling off the Grand Canyon and other famous wonders, most of the land is too remote and desolate to warrant a positive price.
  5. If you look at the U.S. map, however, the preceding objection seems hollow. History, not economics, explains almost all of the variance in government ownership. Land that entered the union prior to the rise of the ideology of conservationism overwhelmingly ended up in private hands. Then John Muir, Theodore Roosevelt, and other proto-green ideologues arrived on the scene to preach the anti-impact moral standard. They were wildly successful, managing to keep somewhere between 30% and 90% of all land in late-joining states in government hands.

  • Route through the desolation of West Texas, happily owned by the private sector.
  • West Texas is a mighty refutation of the "government owns the land that nobody else wants" story. If you drive from Amarillo to Lubbock to San Angelo to San Antonio, you'll witness hundreds of linear miles of the most desolate land in the entire country. Yet roads aside, almost every square foot of this "wasteland" is privately owned! What do private owners do with this seemingly worthless territory? Besides oil drilling and a little farming, it looks like they're playing the long game. The population of Texas is rapidly rising, and will ultimately justify their investment.
  • What would privatization do to our glorious national parks? Dramatically improve their management. As I keep saying, free markets do the good things that sound bad, and government does the bad things that sound good. In the current regime, government grossly underprices campgrounds and other facilities, and severely restricts their further expansion. This sounds good, but it's bad. Private owners, in contrast, would try to balance natural beauty against human convenience. This sounds bad, but it's good. The point of a park is to maximize total long-run human enjoyment, not avoid impact at all costs.

  1. Large-scale privatization of government land is a wonderful opportunity for domestic charter cities. Want to start a new U.S. population center? Buy a few hundred square miles of uninhabited federal land and try your ideas. "Build it and they will come" overstates, but visionary billionaires like Elon Musk could plausibly build new metropolises from scratch.

I'm not crazy. I know that full privatization of government land is highly unlikely to happen. If even 1% were privatized over the next decade, I'd be amazed. My point is privatization is a massive missed opportunity. And since Build, Baby, Build is all about massive missed opportunities, I really wish I'd included it. If I ever publish an expanded second edition, I definitely will.

Politics

Congratulations to the Finalists of the Harlan Institute-Ashbrook Virtual Supreme Court Competition

High School Students from Minnesota and New York argued before a panel of three federal judges and visited the United States Supreme Court.

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On April 29, 2024, the Harlan Institute and Ashbrook held the championship round for the 12th Annual Virtual Supreme Court competition. The top two teams presented oral argument at the Georgetown Supreme Court Institute in the case of Moody v. NetChoice. Presiding were Judge Royce Lamberth (District Court for the District of Columbia), Judge Gregory E. Maggs (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces), Judge Emin Toro (United States Tax Court). Kevin Bizily and Maxwell Steinberg from Minnesota represented the Petitioner. Nathaniel Marks & Edward Napoli from Regis High School in New York represented the Respondent. After a well-argued round, the judges selected the Petitioners as the Champions, with Kevin Bizily as best oralist.

The students and their coaches offered these generous comments about the competition:

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Affordable Housing

Trillions

Why *Build, Baby, Build* should be a top libertarian priority. First in a series of guest-blogging posts.

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In 1962, the New Individualist Review featured a joke letter from Chiang Kai-shek:

I was delighted with your last issue. I can testify from bitter experience that your Dr. Rothbard is entirely correct when he demonstrates that public ownership of lighthouses is the first step on the road to communism.

The point of the joke, on my reading, was not that libertarians were wrong to favor the privatization of lighthouses, but that they should make lighthouse privatization a low priority. For two reasons:

First, lighthouses are a tiny issue in the broad scheme of things. Divided by GDP, government lighthouse funding is a rounding error.

Second, the idea that privatized lighthouses would work well is speculative. Despite past experience and technological progress, we can't confidently predict that the reform will be a resounding libertarian success story.

You just have to flip these two reasons around to figure out what libertarians should prioritize. Namely: big issues with proven free-market remedies. Which was a major motivation behind my new Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation. A non-fiction graphic novel, the latest Caplan book combines words and pictures to make academic research on housing an edge-of-your-seat experience.

 

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I gradually grokked the horror of housing regulation over the last fifteen years. Economists like Edward Glaeser and Joe Gyourko just kept publishing papers showing that government regulation has raised housing prices far above the physical cost of land and construction.

And what regulation has ruined, deregulation can repair.

It's tempting to look at America's most expensive addresses and repeat the top three principles of real estate: "location, location, location." But this glosses over the artificiality of today's locational scarcity. Since the dawn of the skyscraper, technology has allowed vast populations to simultaneously enjoy the world's top locations. The government response, in turn, has been to make building skyscrapers in desirable places nearly legally impossible.

Indeed, U.S. regulators view almost all multifamily housing with deep suspicion. That's why they zone a supermajority of residential land for single-family homes. But even the single-family supply is heavily restricted, because governments routinely set high minimum lot sizes to force builders to waste most of their land. Physically fitting six mansions on an acre is easy, but legally you're lucky to get a green light for one.

Averaging over the whole U.S., a conservative estimate is that regulation has doubled the price of housing. It's much worse in places like the Bay Area and Manhattan, and a minor issue in the countryside. But as a recent paper by Gyourko and Krimmel shows, regulation raises prices almost everywhere that lots of people actually want to reside.

Granted, if regulation doubled the price of chewing gum, it still wouldn't make sense for libertarians to prioritize the industry. The key supporting fact is that shelter is a large share of the average American's budget — around 20%. As a matter of arithmetic, then, halving the price of housing would cut the cost of living by 10%, raising the standard of living by 11%. (As you may recall, 1.0/.9≈1.11).

Even better, deregulation will deliver these gains beyond a reasonable doubt. Laissez-faire in housing is not a futurist Libertopia. A hundred years ago, U.S. housing markets were close to laissez-faire, and the least-regulated regions of the U.S. are still close to laissez-faire. Furthermore, we don't have to blithely assume vigorous competition will arise, because vigorous competition in the construction industry already exists. The total number of builders is immense, and even in our regulated world, many are champing at the bit to expand.

Indeed, the construction industry could revolutionize our lives for the better if it simply were free to deploy the technology of a century ago! Work on the Empire State Building started in 1930, and was complete just 410 days later. Imagine what industry would accomplish if we combined the light regulation of the past with the advanced technology of the present.

Almost all political thinkers like to keep up with the news cycle — to talk about the latest, most salacious topics. I've indulged this temptation myself more than once. But if your worldview has merit, you can do so much better than opine on the scandal of the century of the week. Housing deregulation realistically promises to enrich humanity by trillions of dollars. And all government has to do to make this happen is stop preventing it.

Housing Policy

Bryan Caplan, Guest-blogging About his New Book "Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation"

The book makes the case for massively deregulating housing markets.

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(Bryan Caplan)

I am pleased to announce that my George Mason University colleague, economist Bryan Caplan, will be guest-blogging this week about his new book Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing RegulationBryan is a leading public choice scholar, and author of several other well-known books, including The Myth of the Rational Voter,  Selfish Reasons to Have More Kids, The Case Against Education, and Open Borders.  

Here is a summary of the new book:

Why are housing prices in America so unbelievably high, especially in the country's most desirable locations? The superficial answer is "supply and demand," but the deep answer―the reason supply is so low―is a regulatory system that treats developers like criminals.

In Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation, economist Bryan Caplan makes the economic and philosophical case for radical deregulation of this massive market―freeing property owners to build as tall and dense as they wish. Not only would the average price of housing be cut in half, but the building boom unleashed by deregulation would simultaneously reduce inequality, increase social mobility, promote economic growth, reduce homelessness, increase birth rates, help the environment, cut crime, and more.

Combining stunning homage to classic animation with careful interdisciplinary research, Build, Baby, Build takes readers on a grand tour of a bona fide "panacea policy." We can start realizing these missed opportunities as soon as we abandon the widespread misconception that housing regulation solves more problems than it causes.

And here are some early endorsements:

"Bryan Caplan and Ady Branzei have written a fantastically accessible and fantastically fun book explaining why housing is so expensive in the U.S. It is full of insight and sound economic reasoning. I can think of no better book to read for an introduction to understanding why land-use regulations have caused so much damage. It is a perfect book for your 17-year-old daughter or your 70-year-old uncle, for intro econ students or Nobel laureates, and for everyone in between."—Ed Glaeser, Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics and chairman of the Department of Economics, Harvard University

"Bryan Caplan is a pioneer in the use of graphic novels to expound economic concepts. His new book Build, Baby, Build is thus a landmark in economic education, how to present economic ideas, and the integration of economic analysis and graphic visuals. If you want to learn the economics, ethics, and political economy of YIMBY― namely the freedom to build this is the very best place to start."—Tyler Cowen, Holbert L. Harris Chair of Economics at George Mason University and founder of Marginal Revolution

"The issue of building more is too important to be left for dry monographs. Fortunately, Bryan Caplan is on the case with another in his string of original, brilliant, and important books that is also readable and engaging. After my son read Open Borders, he asked me for recommendations of other graphic novels that were just as educational, insightful, and engaging. I finally have a second book to recommend to him."—Jason Furman, former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers and Aetna Professor of the Practice of Economic Policy, Harvard University

"Fabulous! Housing deregulation is an issue in which the libertarians have been changing the minds of the liberals (whether or not they admit it), as we see in liberal YIMBYism. This is the book where you can find the arguments advanced, both rigorously and entertainingly."—Steven Pinker, author of Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress

I will add that I have read the book myself, and I think it's a great achievement, even though I'm not normally a fan of the graphic novel format. In that respect, it's a worthy successor to the author's previous book in the same format, Open Borders (which I discussed here).

Free Speech

"The Global Hate-Speech Conundrum"

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A woman is arrested during a pro-Palestinian demonstration at the Freie Universität Berlin, May 7, 2024. (AP Photo/Markus Schreiber, used pursuant to license from AP Photo)
[A woman is arrested during a pro-Palestinian demonstration at the Freie Universität Berlin, May 7, 2024. (AP Photo/Markus Schreiber, used pursuant to license from AP Photo)] ((AP Photo/Markus Schreiber, used pursuant to license from AP Photo))

A very interesting item by Prof. Kevin Cope (Virginia), which I'm very happy to be able to pass along:

The recent mass arrests of pro-Palestinian demonstrators have left many asking how such suppression can be justified in a free society. Yet—despite some clear instances of excessive force—U.S. legal tolerance for protests is a global outlier, even among liberal democracies. Since October, U.S. public officials and college administrators have condoned most anti-Israel protests, including (for a while) long-term encampments that violate university rules. Many have provided police protection, even while some protestors voiced support for Hamas's October 7 massacre, lobbed arguably anti-Semitic insults, or called for further violence against Israeli Jews.

In Europe, officials are responding quite differently.

In the days and weeks after October 7, with the Israel Defense Force's retaliation in Gaza well underway, the Eiffel Tower was lit up with the Star of David, and crowds spontaneously sang the Israeli national anthem. Meanwhile, the French Interior Minister instituted a ban on all pro-Palestinian protests.

In Germany, 10,000 joined a pro-Israel rally, while public expressions of pro-Palestinian messages as benign as "stop the war" were prohibited. Berlin police announced that chanting "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free" was a criminal offense. In Berlin schools, Palestinian flag colors and the kaffiyeh—a traditional Middle Eastern scarf now associated with Palestinian nationalism—were banned, while other ethnic apparel was permitted. The first pro-Palestinian demonstration was finally permitted in Hamburg in late October 2023, but with a limit on Palestinian flags and a prohibition on questioning Israel's right to exist. And similar to Germany, the British Home Secretary directed police that "From the river to the sea … " may "amount to a racially aggravated … public order offence," in some contexts, punishable by imprisonment.

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