New at Reason

Tim | July 26, 2007, 11:47am | #

I think a "happiness" drug would be a bad thing if it disable people to discover they were in a bad situation. Lets say for instance A makes you unhappy but since you are on the "Happy" drug you don't notice and continue to live in that situation because you now don't know any better. Being uneasy or unhappy about a situation is the reason for action. Without it, we don't act. I don't know, seems like something I wouldn't want to do. But hey, if you want to be fake happy my guest. I'm just sayin'.......

gaijin | July 26, 2007, 12:00pm | #

Mindfiles is interesting in a digital scrapbooking sort of way, but wasn't that the idea of the implanted memories in Blade Runner?

I suspect alot of the transhumanist's ideas are derived from Golden Age Sci-Fi...not that there is anything wrong with that!

Rex Rhino | July 26, 2007, 12:04pm | #

If they upload my brain to computer, can they just upload me into a neverending game of Doom?

Lamar | July 26, 2007, 12:42pm | #

Oh dear gosh. We need shorter lives, not longer ones.

StupendousMan | July 26, 2007, 2:58pm | #

Umbriel,

That's assuming your consciousness is an unbroken event starting when you first become aware to your death. I don't think it is.

Imagine while you're sleeping tonight your brain is mapped (you're physical body is then destroyed) and downloaded into a simulation. Would you notice that you had been turned off and turned on again when you wake up? If your brain makes changes while you're sleeping (neuronal connections, dumping memories, etc.) are you someone else every morning?

If your consciousness is just a pattern of neurons then the pattern is you not the hardware it runs on.
*it may not be but all the evidence points that way.

Stevo Darkly | July 27, 2007, 4:22am | #

Umbriel: While the "uploading" idea is appealing in some ways, I have a basic philosophical problem with it as a form of immortality. I fail to see how creating an exact duplicate of me, physical or virtual, does _me_ any real good. It's more like having a child than becoming immortal yourself.

I agree. If you're merely making a copy, not "transferring" your consciousness somehow, then what you've got is a copy, not you.

Umbriel,

That's assuming your consciousness is an unbroken event starting when you first become aware to your death. I don't think it is.

Imagine while you're sleeping tonight your brain is mapped (you're physical body is then destroyed) and downloaded into a simulation. Would you notice that you had been turned off and turned on again when you wake up?

You wouldn't have the opportunity to "notice" because you would have been destroyed in your sleep. A completely different person -- one who happens to have a recording of your memories -- would wake up the next morning. He might think he's you ... he might not be able to tell the difference ... but he'd be wrong. That's his subjective, but erroneous, viewpoit. It's all because his copied memories don't include memories of the original you being destroyed.

This should make it clear: Suppose the original "you" is not destroyed. Suppose the copied mind is downloaded into a clone of yoru body. The next morning, both of you wake up. While your copy might be subjectively convinced he's you, from an objective observer's viewpoint is there really any doubt that "you" is really the continuously existing original? Do "you" somehow exist twice now?

If the copy isn't "you" in the second example, how could it be in the first example?

If your brain makes changes while you're sleeping (neuronal connections, dumping memories, etc.) are you someone else every morning? No, but again, you are assuming that a set of memories = "you."

I must respectfully disagree.

Stevo Darkly | July 27, 2007, 5:44pm | #

"You wouldn't have the opportunity to "notice" because you would have been destroyed in your sleep."

That's part of my point, you don't notice anything when you're sleeping- you're essentially shut down.

Your subjective and conscious experience is shut down, and perceives nothing as happening, but that doesn't mean it's the objective truth of what's going on. You're not conscious of time passing while you're asleep, either -- but when you wake up, lo and behold, it has.

In your scenario, at most you've made a copy of "you" that thinks he is you -- but the actual "you" is dead and gone. This is not a path to personal immortality, even if your copy and your other survivors can't tell the difference. The "you" that might have been able to tell the difference -- "Hey, that guy isn't really me!" -- is dead and gone.

It's not immortality -- it's simply killing the only witness who can testify otherwise.

"If the copy isn't "you" in the second example, how could it be in the first example?"

Why does "you" have to define a singular entity. If you could make an instantaneous copy of someone they would both be the same person for a while until there experiences caused them to diverge. If you couldn't tell the difference and they couldn't is there even a point(except for legal issues of property ownership, etc.) in making a distinction between the original and the copy?

They wouldn't both be the same person until their experiences start to diverge ... they would be two different people with the same memories until their two different experiences caused their memories to diverge. We don't consider identical twins to be one person at the point when they are born. (Or before, once they split into two different entities experiencing their environment separately.)

"No, but again, you are assuming that a set of memories = "you.""

Memories plus neural connections. What else is there?

I offer a 2-part answer addressing two aspects of this issue.

Answer A:
What is a photocopy but black plastic powder melted onto a piece of paper? You can make as many copies of a copy as you want (assume the copies are perfect reproductions) and maybe everyone else can't tell the difference, but there is still one specific piece of paper that is the original. Functionally, to the viewpoint of everyone but the original copy, the copies may be interchangeable, but in essence there is only one original.

If you make a copy of a page, keep the copy, but destroy the original, then the original can't be said to be "immortal." It is gone. Whether or not it matters to external observers is a different issue.

A copy of you is an external observer with a copy of your memories -- not you.

Answer B:
Part of what makes you "you" is how you have experiences and process them. The memory of the experiences that you happen to retain are only a part of you. For example, you doubtless had experiences as a child that you no longer remember. But "you" still had those experiences, whether or not they are part of your memory. Clearly, then, your memories cannot be the totality of "you."

Part of having unique experiences as "you" is occupying a particular point in space and interacting with the rest of the universe from that point. Only one entity can occupy a particular point in space at a time; therefore, there can be only one "you" at a time.

BTW, did you know that some AI researchers believe that it may be impossible to create an intelligent "mind" without a body? In other words, a disembodied brain (organic or electronic) might not be able to function as a human-analog intelligent being without possessing a human-analog body? In yet other words, your body and the way it interacts with the external environment may be as much what makes you "you" as your brain and nervous system.

StupendousMan | July 28, 2007, 1:26pm | #

"We don't consider identical twins to be one person at the point when they are born. (Or before, once they split into two different entities experiencing their environment separately.)"

I don't think your analogy works.

One- identical twins aren't truly identical. In my example the two entities are perfectly identical- their bodies, memories, reactions, dreams for the future etc.

Two- the perfectly identical entities cannot tell the difference between themselves- without evidence each thinks they are the original. Identical twins (Bob and Tom) know who Bob is and who Tom is.

"If you make a copy of a page, keep the copy, but destroy the original, then the original can't be said to be "immortal." It is gone. Whether or not it matters to external observers is a different issue."

I think your point goes the the heart of our disagreement. I don't think the document is defined by the physical piece of paper but by the information stored there. In your example the information still lives. As long as the information is copied to another piece of paper when the original paper wears out the information(that which defines the paper's individuality) is essentially immortal.

"Only one entity can occupy a particular point in space at a time; therefore, there can be only one "you" at a time."

In the case of the perfectly copied entity the second the copy and original wake up they start to diverge but they both start out as "you".

I'm curious, what are your thoughts about people who die(ex. drown in cold water) and are brought back to life. Isn't it the operating system that's rebooted? Isn't that what defines a living person? I'll push it a bit- my computer can boot Windows or Linux, it's this that defines the computer not the hardware that it runs on. The hardware certainly provides some context but I don't see as any different than, say, my brain being transplanted into another body- it would still be me.

"BTW, did you know that some AI researchers believe that it may be impossible to create an intelligent "mind" without a body?"

I have heard that. In the case of a downloaded mind a body could be simulated. After all, the reality we experience through our sense organs is just a simulation our brain creates. Some have postulated that we are in a simulation now. Wouldn't that make this discussion ironic?

Thanks for your thoughtful responses. They've certainly got me thinking.