The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Hans Bader on Selective Law Enforcement

Police in some major cities are refusing to enforce the law against protest "encampments"

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I have been increasingly aware of, and disturbed by, instances of local police declining the requests of universities to help the universities–which generally do not have law enforcement officers capable of dealing with hundreds of people resisting arrest–arrest  protestors and remove their protest encampments. I was preparing to write a blog post about this, but Hans Bader beat me to it. So rather than reinvent the wheel, with permission, below is a shortened version of Hans' post:

You have a right to free speech, but that doesn't give you a First Amendment right to camp out on my lawn with protest signs. That's trespassing. But government officials sometimes allow trespassing when they sympathize with the trespasser's viewpoint. Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC have refused to remove progressive anti-Israel protesters camping out at private universities — Johns Hopkins University, the University of Pennsylvania, and George Washington University.

Law professor David Bernstein notes that "Baltimore police will not assist in removing illegal encampment at Johns Hopkins University. Worse, they actually praise the illegal encampment as a valid exercise of First Amendment rights, which is complete nonsense. It's especially nonsensical because most of the protesters are trespassers with no connection to the university."

"The City of Baltimore strongly stands with every person's First Amendment rights. Barring any credible threat of violence or similarly high threshold to protect public safety, BPD currently has no plans to engage solely to shut down this valid protest or remove protesters," said the Baltimore police department in a statement apparently dictated by the mayor's office.

Contrary to what this statement claims, there is no "First Amendment" right to camp out on public property, much less private property like the campus of Johns Hopkins University, which can tell trespassers to leave regardless of whether they are engaged in First Amendment activity. Camping out on someone else's property is not a "valid protest," even if the protesters have not yet made any "threat of violence." The Supreme Court ruled that protesters do not have a right to camp out even on public property devoted to public use, like national parks, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984).

Yet Neetu Arnold of the National Association of Scholars notes that Philadelphia is similarly refusing to clear out a protest camp at the University of Pennsylvania, a private Ivy League university: "Philadelphia Police ignores Penn's request to disband unauthorized encampment. The university has to provide proof that the encampment poses an imminent danger. Penn students have received multiple warnings to avoid the immediate area." The Daily Pennsylvanian reports that the "Philadelphia Police Department declines to disband encampment after Penn requests immediate help."

As a University of Pennsylvania alumnus notes, these illegal protests are only being allowed by progressive officials because of the viewpoint they are expressing. If the protesters were "white nationalists waving nazi flags and telling black people they should go back to Africa I'm sure [police] would be out there pretty quickly" to remove them.

As Professor Bernstein observes, allowing the illegal encampment at Johns Hopkins to persist despite the university's objections is a bad idea: "This one poses a special danger to public safety because, I'm told by a reliable source, 'almost none' of the people manning the encampment are Hopkins students. They are professional agitators from 'the community.'"

No city would tolerate such trespassing if the protesters' ideology were different — such as if they were white nationalists, whose speech is protected by the First Amendment despite their repellent ideology. (The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a First Amendment lawsuit by white nationalists in 1992, because even racist protests are protected by the First Amendment, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992). Even on school grounds, racist speech can be protected, such as Nazi meetings on school grounds, see National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers (1973)).

This favoritism by progressive cities violates the First Amendment. According to the Supreme Court, the government cannot favor certain kinds of protests over others. (See Police Department v. Mosley (1972)).

When someone posted non-threatening confederate-flag flyers saying "Huzzah for Dixie" at American University in 2017, the local FBI office investigated the flyers as if the First Amendment did not exist, at the request of the university. Law enforcement investigated the speech, even though courts in Washington, DC had ruled that far worse, blatantly racist speech was protected by the First Amendment. (See, e.g., United States v. Popa (1999)).

Yet now, DC police are refusing to remove trespassing students camped out on the grounds of George Washington University. As the National Review reported on April 28:

Police in Washington, D.C., rejected requests from campus officials at George Washington University to clear anti-Israel protesters from their campus encampment this week, fearing that doing so could be bad publicity.

Although police were poised to disband the encampment at around 3 a.m. on Friday morning, city officials in the police chief's and mayor's office told police to stand down and said that it would look bad publicly for police to disrupt a "small number of peaceful protesters," the Washington Post reported on Friday…George Washington officials originally wanted to clear the encampment by 7 p.m. on Thursday. The school said on Friday that protesters "violated several university policies and were trespassing" and added that "any student who remains in University Yard may be placed on temporary suspension and administratively barred from campus. Several students have already been notified of their suspensions." Police who reportedly lined the encampment's perimeter on Friday warned protesters that they would soon issue arrests, but they never did.

"After demonstrators refused multiple instructions to relocate, GWPD requested additional support from the DC Metropolitan Police to ensure the safety and security of all our community members through a measured and orderly approach," George Washington said in a statement….Dozens of anti-Israel protesters are still occupying the encampment…At a rally held at George Washington this week, a speaker was recorded saying, "There's only one solution, intifada revolution. We must have a revolution so we can have a socialist reconstruction of the United States of America."

David Bernstein adds: Denver police have also refused to help with an encampment. UCLA police sat by and did nothing for days while members of encampment prohibited, by physical forces, students from getting to their classes or the library via the encampment without permission. Police only intervened after violence broke out when counter-demonstrators confronted the encampers.

From what I can gather, the problem in cities is usually not that the police department itself is unwilling to assist, but that they are under orders from the mayor, afraid of upsetting far left constituents, to stand down. This is going a bit beyond my expertise, but from what I understand the Justice Department could and should, but won't under the Biden administration, investigate whether these police departments are violating the terms of their federal funding, and also denying equal protection of the law, by refusing to enforce the law for ideological and political reasons. An added factor is that this lack of enforcement is to the specific detriment of Jewish students who have disproportionately faced threats, intimidation, and violence from people at the encampments.

 

NY State v. Trump Does Violate Trump's First Amendment Rights

The 34 misdemeanor charges of falsifying business record to conceal some other crime clearly contemplate a violation of federal or state elections laws and that "other crime" is not a crime because of the First Amendment

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My co-blogger Orin Kerr says that President Donald Trump's First Amendment rights are not being violated by the NY State prosecution of him because Trump is being prosecuted only for falsifying business records. But, the indictment of Trump specifically says that Trump had falsified business records "to conceal another crime". That other crime is presumably a violation of federal or NY State election law, and the First Amendment protects Trump's right to make hush money payments for purposes of winning the 2016 presidential election. The 34 counts in the indictment, in any event, are for misdemeanor offenses as to which the statute of limitations has run.

Shockingly, in this first ever prosecution of a former president, Alvin Bragg, the NY State District Attorney, is coy about what felony is being concealed by the allegedly falsified expenses. The reason he is being coy is because there is no other felony that Trump was concealing. And, if there were one it would be a state or federal campaign finance law, which would violate Trump's First Amendment rights.

All that Donald Trump has to do to get any verdict against him overturned is to insist that the predicate felony, which NY alleges he was concealing is not a crime under the Constitution because the First Amendment trumps campaign finance law (pun intended). To the extent that Buckley v. Valeo sustains any such campaign finance violation, Trump should ask the U.S. Supreme Court on his ultimate appeal to overrule Buckley v. Valeo.

Qualified Immunity

Interesting Fifth Circuit Denial of Qualified Immunity to Police Officers

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From Hughes v. Few, decided yesterday by Judge Andrew Oldham, joined by Judges E. Grady Jolly and Kurt Engelhardt; for the details, read the opinion itself:

For those who worry that qualified immunity can be invoked under absurd circumstances: Buckle up.

Austin Thompson Hughes is a Good Samaritan. After 2:30 a.m., Hughes called 911 to report a pickup truck swerving violently across a four-lane highway in Houston. While Hughes was on the phone with emergency dispatchers, the drunk driver crashed. Still on the phone with 911, Hughes pulled behind the drunk driver and effectuated a citizen's arrest in accordance with Texas law. But when police officers arrived at the scene, they let the drunk driver go and then arrested Good Samaritan Hughes. (Seriously.) Piling insanity on irrationality, the officers then charged Hughes with a felony for impersonating a peace officer. Hughes spent thousands of dollars defending against the frivolous criminal charges before the City of Houston dropped them. Then Hughes brought this § 1983 suit against the two officers who victimized him. The district court denied qualified immunity. We affirm. (Obviously.) …

In the context of split-second excessive force cases, the Supreme Court has "repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at too high a level of generality." That is so because in the typical excessive-force case, officers must make life-or-death split-second decisions, often at night or in the chaos of a deadly chase or both. This case does not involve excessive force, or split-second decisions, or the chaos of a chase. Rather, it involves a simple, clearly established rule that all officers should know at all times under Franks and Winfrey: Do not lie….

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No, Trump Does Not Have a First Amendment Defense In His New York Criminal Case

A response to Steve Calabresi.

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I have mixed views about New York's prosecution of Donald Trump—if you look at all the crimes Trump has committed, the ones charged in New York seem comparatively minor—but I do not agree with my co-blogger Steve Calabresi's claim that Trump has a First Amendment defense to the charges.

First off, Trump was not charged with paying hush money.  As I understand the indictment, Trump is charged with 34 counts of keeping false business records.  It's not the payments to keep Daniels quiet that is the claimed crime; it's the keeping of false records needed to keep quiet that he had paid off Daniels to keep quiet.  (To put a new spin on an old saying: it's not the coverup, it's the covering-up of the coverup.) Whether Trump would have a First Amendment right to pay Daniels to keep quiet is irrelevant, as that was not charged as a crime.

To say that Trump has a First Amendment defense, then, I think you need to take the astonishing view that crimes somehow related to spending that helps a political candidate is protected by the First Amendment.  Even acknowledging that Steve's vision is not intended to be rooted in current law, but rather in a vision of what he thinks First Amendment should be read to be, I don't think I see how there could be a First Amendment right to do that.  As far as I know, there is no First Amendment right to commit election-related crimes. Wanting to help a candidate for office doesn't give people a right to cook the books.

Donald Trump Has a First Amendment Right to Pay Hush Money to Support his Electoral Ambitions

The liberal news media buys in to the NY state district attorney's unconstitutional prosecution of Donald Trump

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Every day breathless articles appear in the New York Times, and through-out the liberal media, about Donald Trump's allegedly lawless payment of hush money to help out his 2016 presidential campaign. In fact, Donald Trump has a First Amendment right to spend money, as does the Trump Organization, to further his electoral ambitions. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court wrongly upheld expenditure limits on how much non-candidates could spend on elections, but it rightly held that wealthy individuals like Donald Trump could spend as much as they wanted to spend of their own money on election campaigns. And, they can spend their money on hush money payments, television or radio advertisements, or in any other legal way that would further their own campaigns or electoral ambitions.

To the extent that Trump was spending his own money in the 2016 presidential campaign, he had a First Amendment right to do that under Buckley v. Valeo. To the extent he was spending Trump organization money, Trump also had a First Amendment right to do that too because the campaign expenditure limits of Buckley v. Valeo are now, and have always been, unconstitutional. Buckley v. Valeo should be overruled insofar as it upheld as constitutional any limits on spending money by anyone or by any organization to influence the outcome of an election.

The accounting entries of the hush money payments as "legal expenses" simply reflects the fact that Trump did not believe the allegations against him were true, or that he was protecting his family, or that he considered the payoffs to extortionate porn actresses and others as being settlements that did not confirm his guilt but that helped his 2016 campaign, which they did. The allegedly inaccurate accounting entries are at most misdemeanor offenses. The government in the NY State District Attorney's prosecution does not accuse Trump of embezzling funds from his organization or of fraud, nor could it do so.

Donald Trump should appeal any verdict against him in the NY State criminal case to the U.S. Supreme Court. He should assert his First Amendment rights under Buckley v. Valeo and to the extent that Buckley would allow a judgment against Trump to stand, Trump should ask that the entire edifice of campaign expenditure limits set up in Buckley v. Valeo be overruled.  Legal experts know that Buckley v. Valeo was "a derelict on the waters of the law" even before the recent appointments to the Supreme Court, and in Trump v. New York the U.S. Supreme Court should declare Buckley v. Valeo to be dead on arrival.

All that Trump has to do to win this farcical criminal case against him is to assert his First Amendment rights in every level of New York State's court system asking at every step along the way that Buckley v. Valeo be overruled insofar as it forbade the expenditures in question. Obviously, no-one can spend money to bribe election officials or engage in other illegal conduct. But, nothing Trump has done is remotely illegal. Trump had a First Amendment right to make the hush money payments that he allegedly made in 2016.

Immigration

Migration and the "Military-Age Male" Fallacy

Don't fall for scaremongering about "military-age male" migrants crossing the border. They are actually less dangerous than native-born citizens of the same age and gender.

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(Econlib.)

 

Military-age males are a dangerous, scary lot. Best to have as few of them around, as possible. I should know. I used to be one myself.

In recent months, GOP politicians and other immigration restrictionists have been sounding the alarm about the presence of large numbers of "military-age males" among migrants crossing the southern border. There is no justification for such alarmism. "Military-age male" migrants don't pose any special danger. Indeed, they are, on average, less dangerous than native-born citizens of the same description.  Nor is there any reason to be much concerned about the fact that this group may be overrepresented among illegal migrants.

The definition of "military-age male" isn't clear. But, most likely, it refers to men between the ages of about 18 and 45—the age group that includes most military personnel. If so, it's not surprising that illegal migrants may be disproportionately drawn from this category. After all, most migrants are fleeing poor and repressive societies in hopes of finding greater freedom and opportunity. For obvious reasons, men in their prime working years are more likely to migrate in search of employment than children or the elderly.

In addition, illegal migration often involves risks created by participation in an illegal market. Undocumented migrants may be victimized by criminals, detained in awful conditions by US authorities, or suffer other dangers. On average, men are far more risk-acceptant than women. Thus, it isn't surprising that they are more likely to be willing to risk the dangers of illegal migration. If you want to increase the proportion of women and children among migrants, the best way is to make legal migration easier, thereby making the process much less dangerous.

That said, the disproportion between men and women in the illegal migrant population is far from overwhelming. The Migration Policy Institute estimates that women make up 46% of the US undocumented immigrant population. That's only modestly lower than their proportion of the overall US population (about 51%). And, far from seeing a surge in the percentage of single males among undocumented immigrants, 2023 actually saw an increase in the percentage of undocumented migrants who come in family groups.

One concern about military-age male migrants is the fear that they might be terrorists. But the number of people killed in terrorist attacks in the United States perpetrated by illegal migrants who crossed the southern border from 1975 to the present is zero. Either the incidence of terrorists among males who cross the southern border is extremely low, or they are extremely bad at committing actual acts of terrorism. Male undocumented migrants actually have a substantially lower incidence of terrorist attacks than native-born citizens do.

There is also no good evidence that military-age male migrants are somehow agents of foreign military forces, planning an invasion. Being a military-age male doesn't mean you are likely to be a member of any actual military force or have any military skills. Similarly, the fact that younger males are, on average, better basketball players than women and older men, doesn't mean that most young men are actually professional basketball players, or have more than rudimentary playing skill. Calling them "basketball-age males" doesn't change that reality. I have criticized the "invasion" narrative in more detail here.

There is one kernel of truth to concerns about military-age males: men, especially young men, have a much higher crime rate than women do. They commit a hugely disproportionate percentage of violent and property crimes. For example, in 2019, according to FBI data, men accounted for almost 89% of those arrested for murder, and just under 97%of those arrested for rape.

However, if you worry about undocumented military-age males for this reason, you should worry about native-born ones even more. That's because undocumented immigrants have much lower crime rates than native-born Americans do. In Texas between 2013 and 2022, for example, undocumented immigrants (2.2 homicides per 100,000 people per year), are about 36% less likely to commit homicide than native-born citizens (3.0 per 100,000 per year). And that's without controlling for age and gender. If you do control for those variables, the gap between undocumented immigrants' and natives' crime rates becomes even larger, due to the  greater proportion of younger males among the former.

Obviously, in any large group, there are going to be some dangerous individuals. The point is not that military-age male migrants are risk-free (they aren't!), but that the incidence of that risk is low.

Conservatives rightly condemn left-wingers who claim all men are potential rapists. While the incidence of rape by men is vastly higher than that by women, the vast majority of men are not rapists and never will be. The same reasoning applies to right-wing scaremongering about "military-age male" migrants. Stigmatizing a large group based on the crimes of a small minority is wrong. And that's especially true if the group's overall crime rate is actually lower than that of comparably situated members of the rest of the population (in this case, male native-born Americans).

In sum, there is nothing surprising or sinister about the relative overrepresentation of "military-age males" among undocumented immigrants. And these men are actually, on average, less dangerous than native-born Americans of the same age and gender.

Obviously, there are many rationales for immigration restrictions and harsh border policies unrelated to fear of military-age males, or even to crime and terrorism, more generally. Some  are more defensible than fear of military-age males. I have tried to address many of them in other writings, such as my book Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom. Here, I hope to help clear away a bad argument, so we can devote more attention to better ones.

The Hysterical Opposition to the Antisemitism Awareness Act is Unfounded

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I have a piece up at National Review Online about the Antisemitism Awareness Act. As described in my article, the most important feature of the act is that it codifies administrative guidance that began in the Bush Administration holding that Jews are protecting from ethnic discrimination by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Before 2003, the Department of Education treated Jews an exclusively religious group not covered by the Act.

The controversial part of the Act is that it codifies the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in the context of determining discriminatory intent for related allegedly discriminatory actions in Title VI enforcement. That definition gives examples of statements that, depending on the context, could be antisemitic. Some of those examples relate to Israel, and one of those discusses the use of anti-Jewish tropes with origins in Christian polemic used against Israel. This had led to hysterical and wildly inaccurate claims that the law criminalizes criticism of Israel, or will somehow lead to making Christianity illegal. I explain in the peace why these claims are nonsense. I note that It's hard to imagine anyone sensible arguing that the statement, "Of course Israel is massacring Palestinians, that's exactly what Christ-Killers would do" can't be evidence of discriminatory intent for related action.

More sober critics, like co-blogger Eugene V. earlier today, worry about the chilling effect it will have on anti-Israel speech given that hostile environment cases sometimes rest in part on speech that would otherwise be constitutionally protected. I respond so such critics as follows:

That is indeed a real concern. But that's a problem with hostile-environment law more generally. With or without official adoption of the IHRA definition, university officials already have an incentive to clamp down on all sorts of speech that could be deemed hostile to various groups. In practice, though, they mostly use Title VI as an excuse to try to censor speech that offends woke sensibilities.

That, in fact, is the broader reason wokesters are hostile to AAA. Currently, there is a double standard, with antisemitic speech that might contribute to a hostile environment treated with much more equanimity than speech hostile to other groups. This is illegal discrimination against Jewish students, and is essential to the entire DEI edifice. If the AAA and other new laws incentivize universities to treat members of all protected classes (including white students discriminated against based on race) equally, than the whole ideological structure of DEI as we know it, which depends on preferences for favored groups, collapses.

Returning to the more hysterical critics, I note that

the Department of Education has been using the IHRA definition of antisemitism for Title VI enforcement since 2018. As president, Donald Trump also issued an executive order making the IHRA definition applicable government-wide. Over 30 states and dozens of localities have adopted the IHRA definition. Criticism of Israel is still legal, as is, of course, reading and preaching the New Testament. Those who claim that the limited adoption of this definition for evidentiary purposes in Title VI proceedings is a big step on the road to authoritarian dystopia are displaying a combination of ignorance and mendacity, often with a significant dollop of anti-Jewish conspiracy theory.

I never say in the piece whether I like the IHRA definition, or whether I think it should be codified for Title VI (or other) purposes. But there is so much misinformation floating around that I thought it was important to clarify the very low stakes of this bill, given that it does not change the status quo.

Free Speech

Massachusetts High Court Upholds Ban on Picketing Within 200 Feet of Courthouse in Karen Read Murder Trial

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From Spicuzza v. Commonwealth, decided yesterday by the Massachusetts High court:

The petitions stemmed from the ongoing trial, in the Superior Court in Norfolk County, in Commonwealth vs. Karen Read. Read has been indicted for murder, among other crimes, and the case has garnered significant public interest, including protests and demonstrations in the vicinity of the court house complex….

The trial court issued an order stating,

no individual may demonstrate in any manner, including carrying signs or placards, within 200 feet of the courthouse complex during trial of this case, unless otherwise ordered by this Court. This complex includes the Norfolk Superior courthouse building and the parking area behind the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds building. Individuals are also prohibited from using audio enhancing devices while protesting….

The Massachusetts high court upheld the order:

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Climate Change

Are State Law Climate Change Tort Suits Preempted by Federal Law?

A recent panel discussion on whether state and local suits against fossil fuel producers are preempted by federal law (and my arguments for why the answer is "no, they are not").

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Honolulu, like many state and local governments around the country, is suing fossil fuel companies alleging a range of state-law torts related to climate change. The defendants in such cases have been trying to get the suits dismissed, or transferred to more favorable forums.

Initially the defendants sought to have the cases removed to federal court, but those efforts universally failed. Now they are trying to claim that the various state-law claims are preempted by federal law.

The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the preemption claims in Honolulu v. Sunoco. Now Sunoco and the other defendants are seeking certiorari on the preemption claims.

As long time readers know, I believe the argument that these tort claims are preempted (or displaced) by federal law are baseless. (My longer article on the subject is here.) The federal common law of interstate nuisance may have been displaced by federal environmental regulation, but the Supreme Court has explicitly held that federal environmental statutes do not preempt state law claims (though they do prevent plaintiffs in one state from extra-territorializing the substantive standards of their state's laws). Indeed, other than with regard to product standards, federal environmental law rarely preempts state law. Congress could preempt much state regulation and litigation concerning climate change, it just has not done so.

Earlier this week, I participated in a webinar on this issue with AEI's Adam White, NYU law's Richard Epstein, and Alabama Solicitor General Edmund LaCour. The webinar was sponsored by the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State at the Antonin Scalia Law School of George Mason University. We had a few technical hiccups, but I think it was a substantive and worthwhile discussion (even if it was three against one).

 

Here are my prior posts on climate-related tort litigation (as distinct from the Juliana climate litigation):

Free Speech

Message from Johns Hopkins University President

"I am writing today to reiterate the reasons why the encampment is so problematic and why I am calling on you to end it."

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Circulated yesterday "regarding a pro-Palestinian protest initiated at the Homewood campus April 29":

Dear Johns Hopkins Community,

I am sharing with you the message I sent earlier today to the members of the Hopkins Justice Collective and student protesters who are encamped on our Homewood campus.

As I did earlier this week, I chose to speak directly to the protesters, who include members of our community and those unaffiliated with Hopkins, to share the reasons why we are calling for an immediate end to the encampment, which contravenes multiple university policies and codes.

As we head into the final weeks of the academic year and look forward to celebrating our newest graduates at Commencement later this month, we are committed to maintaining a campus environment that values free speech, but also where everyone feels safe and welcome….

[* * *]

Dear Hopkins Justice Collective members and student protesters,

I am writing at a critical juncture in the protest. I appreciated the opportunity to meet with several of you on Monday evening at the start of the encampment you initiated on the Beach and to speak together in an open and constructive way about the purposes of your protest, including your desire to conduct the protest and any programming in a way that would ensure no violence, injury, or anti-Semitic expression.

I am writing today to reiterate the reasons why the encampment is so problematic and why I am calling on you to end it.

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Free Speech

"Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023" (Which Just Passed the House) Could Suppress First-Amendment-Protected Criticism of Israel

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HR6090, which passed the House of Representatives Wednesday by a 320-91 vote, would provide, in relevant part,

For purposes of this Act, the term "definition of antisemitism"—

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Supreme Court

Adler v. Chemerinsky on the U.S. Supreme Court

A civil discussion on the U.S. Supreme Court and its role in American life, past and present.

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Last week, I had the honor and pleasure of participating in a forum at the University of California at Berkeley law school on the U.S. Supreme Court with Dean Erwin Chemerinsky. As one might expect, we disagreed on quite a bit.

The program, "Reshaping American Life: Today's Supreme Court in Historical Context, and its Potential Impact on our Future," was expertly moderated by Justice Carol Corrigan of the California Supreme Court and was the first in a series of programs co-sponsored by the Berkeley Judicial Institute, Bolch Judicial Institute of Duke Law, and the of the American Bar Association Litigation Section.

For those interested, here's a video of the event.

An Embarrassing Letter on Current Events from Academic Social and Personality Psychologists

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The letter, which as of this writing has over 200 hundred signatories, starts off like this:

Social and Personality Psychologists on Student Protests for Justice in Palestine
We are a group of faculty from various demographic, religious, and ethnic backgrounds who are trained in the methods and practice of social and personality psychology. Although there are no doubt many topics on which we disagree, we are united in this call to listen to, engage with, and protect our students as they protest the mass killings of Palestinian civilians—which the International Court of Justice of the United Nations determined "could amount to genocide."

The words in quotations do not appear in the ICJ's opinion. The closest the Court comes to saying anything like that is to say that "at least some of the acts and omissions alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the (Genocide) Convention." The Court, however, made no finding as to whether South Africa's allegations were true, and the Genocide Convention bars actions that are not "genocide," such as incitement to genocide. The only time the words "amount to genocide" without the "could" appear in the opinion is in the court's summary of South Africa's allegations.

It says a lot about the decline of intellectual integrity in academia that so many are willing to sign a statement without due diligence to ensure that what they are signing is accurate, and that whomever drafted the letter either did not bother to check that the letter was accurate, or knew it was inaccurate but did not care.

Free Speech

Again, Someone Trying to Vanish My Post About a Case on One-Sided Pseudonymity

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In February, I wrote about a Fourth Circuit decision in Doe v. Sidar, which discusses one-sided pseudonymity. On Wednesday, Google received a request that it remove that post from its indexes—and thus vanish it from search results—on the theory that the post violated the copyright in a blog post, https://europeannewschannels.blogspot.com/2024/01/fourth-circuit-on-one-sided.html:

Re: Unknown
NOTICE TYPE: DMCA

Copyright claim 1
KIND OF WORK: Unspecified
DESCRIPTION[:] The decision allows such pseudonymity when the defendant has already been found (by default judgment) to have committed the assault, but Judge Wilkinson's concurrence argues that, absent this unusual factor, one-sided pseudonymity should be frowned on.

ORIGINAL URLS: 01. https://europeannewschannels.blogspot.com/2024/01/fourth-circuit-on-one-sided.html

ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING URLS: 01. https://reason.com/volokh/2024/02/21/fourth-circuit-on-one-sided-pseudonymity-in-sexual-assault-cases/

JURISDICTIONS[:] CA

The blogspot.com post has apparently been removed, but there appears to be an archived version here. According to that archive, the supposedly "original" blogspot post purports to have been published Jan. 30, 2024, more than three weeks before the Fourth Circuit opinion (which the post quotes) was released. And the blogspot post talks about and quotes what it refers to as "my amicus brief" in the case; that's actually my brief, which court records show was written by me, and not a brief written by the blogspot post's author. (See also this post from March describing two similar requests that had a similar structure.) [UPDATE 5/3/24, 11:55 am: This paragraph has been revised in light of the archived version (which I hadn't been able to find when I first put up the post); thanks to commenter ReadMyLips88, who pointed me to the archived version.]

This appears to be a known sort of deindexing trick, which I discussed at pp. 300-01 of my Shenanigans (Internet Takedown Edition) piece, and which has been known as far back as 2016, see this Tim Cushing (TechDirt) piece, and likely even earlier. (Again, I say "appears to be" just because the blogspot.com post has been deleted, so I can't verify this, but this seems very likely to be so based on the similarities to what I described here.) Fortunately, it appears that Google has not acted on this request, and I expect that it will not.

I unfortunately can't tell who is behind this; the deindexing requests have submitters' names attached, but those could be just as fake as the rest of the request. But in any event, I thought I'd mention what's going on here. For those curious what someone wants to hide, I copy my original post below.

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The Senate's "Longer Lines, Less Security" Caucus

The Merkley-Kennedy Amendment Would Prevent Travelers From Choosing TSA Lanes with Face Recognition

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There's a new proposal on Capitol Hill to improve air travel. On the one hand, it will slow down passenger screening and lengthen checkpoint lines.  On the other hand, it will make you a little less safe.

Remarkably, the idea of combining slower TSA wait times with weaker security has bipartisan support from fourteen Senators, led by Sen. Merkley (D-OR) and Sen. Kennedy (R-LA). Naturally, they're not selling their proposal that way. Instead, they claim to be saving air travelers from themselves—and from Big Brother.

They're wrong on all counts.

The Merkley-Kennedy amendment to FAA reauthorization will be offered in the next few days. If passed, it would prevent TSA from expanding its use of face recognition technology in place of ID checks.

This is remarkable. We've all gone through TSA checkpoints juggling a carry-on in one hand and a briefcase or purse in the other while using any leftover hands to hold wallets and present IDs to the TSA officer. Lacking four hands, each passenger spends time fumbling with these items at the checkpoint, guaranteeing an extra couple of minutes' delay; at a busy airport, that all adds up to much longer wait times for everyone

TSA's pilot project, Touchless ID, is far more efficient.  I saw it in action at Atlanta's airport as a member of the Commission on Seamless and Secure Travel. Passengers walk up, stand on a circle, look at the camera, and are cleared in seconds. Even when the neighboring PreCheck line was backed up, the lane for Touchless ID never had more than one or two people in it. I've never seen happier people at a TSA checkpoint.

Maybe that's what worries politicians and groups like the ACLU, who have campaigned relentlessly against facial recognition. They're afraid they'll lose if they let ordinary travelers make up their own minds about TSA and facial recognition.

It sure looks like that's what Senators Merkley and Kennedy have in mind. Their amendment would flat-out prohibit TSA from expanding face recognition at its checkpoints—in Atlanta or at an airport near you.

What justifies this ban? Well, advocacy groups claim that face recognition invades privacy and discriminates based on travelers' race. But neither charge is true.

Privacy fears are particularly overdone; the system I saw compared a picture the government already had (a passport photo) to a picture taken at the checkpoint and then discarded. And everyone who got in that lane knew what they were doing; the whole process is built on consent

Claims of bias based on skin tone or race, meanwhile, are years out of date. According to recent studies by TSA and CBP and by NIST, facial recognition systems demonstrate a negligible difference in accuracy when identifying members of different groups, as long as the systems use good algorithms, good lighting, and good cameras. TSA's sister agency, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), uses such a system already, and in daily use, it shows no significant demographic disparities, operating at an accuracy rate that consistently exceeds 98 percent.

What about security? It turns out that human beings are nowhere near 98 percent accuracy when they check ID. The technology is far better at matching faces than even experienced passport examiners. As for bias, it's worth remembering that handing decisions to human being doesn't eliminate that risk. If you want to be safer, and run less risk of bias, algorithmic face recognition is the better choice.

That leaves just one question for supporters of the Kennedy-Merkley amendment.

Why are you afraid to let travelers make their own decisions about face recognition?

Politics

Today in Supreme Court History: May 3, 1802

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5/3/1802: Washington D.C. incorporated as the capital of the United States. Article I, Section 8 empowers Congress to "To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States."

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